Hicks' thread (out of the equilibrium labyrinth) by Bianco, Antonio
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Hicks’ thread (out of the equilibrium
labyrinth)
Antonio Bianco
DISSE, Sapienza University of Rome
May 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56249/
MPRA Paper No. 56249, posted 30. May 2014 13:53 UTC
Hicks’ thread




The work of John Hicks is an unending source of inspiration for many
economists and an unsolved dilemma for historians of economic thought.
These pages highlight the fact that Hicks’ peculiar perspective on the
economic agent constitutes the substructure underlying his research
path, and the common premise to his theories of markets, liquidity,
capital, and risk. Hicks’ theory of the agent was intended to address
the factual role of non-measurable risk (i.e., learning-management),
and was primarily concerned with the price- and wealth-effects that
the transaction costs (costs of learning and moving) entail for learning-
induced behaviours.
JEL codes: B31, D01, E41.
Key words: Non-Measurable Risk, Transaction Costs, Liquidity Con-
straints, Fixprice, Micro-Foundations.
It is the new things that
humanity has discovered which
makes its history exciting; and
the new things that may be found
in the future, before humanity
blows itself up, or settles down
to some ghastly ‘equilibrium’,
make a future worth praying for,
and worth working for.
Hicks 1976B [1982], p. 300
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1 John and the Johns
John Richard Hicks (1904-1989), ‘one of the last great generalists in a
discipline that is more and more balkanized into pointed specializations’
(Dostaler, 2001, p. 22), is still a source of inspiration for economists of all
schools and an unsolved dilemma for historians of economic thought. In
1972 he shared a Nobel prize for his contributions to general equilibrium
theory and welfare economics, ‘part of the standard literature of what is
called in modern controversy neoclassical economics’ (Hicks, 1977, p. v).
Yet he greeted this honour ‘with mixed feelings’ (ib.). The inner chagrin he
repressed on that solemn occasion broke free some years later, in a joking-
provocative tone, after the umpteenth neoclassical interpretation of his oeu-
vre:
Clearly I need to change my name. Let it be understood that Value and
Capital (1939) was the work of J.R. Hicks, a ‘neoclassical’ economist
now deceased; while Capital and Time (1973) – and A Theory of Eco-
nomic History (1969) – are the work of John Hicks, a non-neo-classic
who is quite disrespectful toward his ‘uncle’. The latter works are
meant to be read independently, and not to be interpreted . . . in the
light of their predecessor. (1975, p. 365)
Provocation aside, however, he unequivocally claimed that J.R. and John’s
oeuvre ran along the same track. His recollection of his first time in the
U.S., in 1946, invited by Samuelson, Arrow, Friedman and Patinkin, is a
case in point:
I did not know them, but they knew me; for I was the author of Value
and Capital, which was deeply influencing their work. They regarded
it as the beginning of their ‘neoclassical synthesis’ . . . But I am afraid
I disappointed them; and have continued to disappoint them. Their
achievements have been great, but they are not in my line. (1979A
[1983], p. 361, my it.)
Many authoritative commentators, such as Leijonhufvud (1977), Solow
(1984), and Pasinetti (2008), deny the consistency and predictability of such
a line. As Hicks did actually change his publishing name from J.R. to
John, they somehow turn the above-mentioned provocation into an asser-
tion. On the other hand, Hicks experts1 complain that this name change
is given undue consequence (Hamouda, 1993, p. xiv), since his ‘intellectual
output shows a surprising continuity . . . The causal structure associated
with decision-making and with the implementation of decisions has been
central to his theoretical work’ (Scazzieri and Zamagni, 2008, p. 4).
1Most of the literature concerned with Hicks’ works is to be found in these collections
(containing several reprints of journal articles): Wolfe, 1968; OEP, 1984; McKenzie and
Zamagni, 1991; Hamouda, 1993; Hagemann and Hamouda, 1994; Puttaswamaiah, 2001;
Scazzieri et al, 2008; Hagemann and Scazzieri, 2009.
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Manifold reasons lay behind these diverging views of the history of Hicks’
thought, including his immense theoretical production2 and his prudent
attitude towards the economic theory3 (an attitude very dE`modE` among
economists). Yet the intuition inspiring the present study is that a good
deal of this ambiguity is due to an element essential to his approach that,
because of its rootedness, he barely disclosed (cf. Laidler, 1994, pp. 169f),
and little or nothing of which his commentators have brought out4.
The object of this article is the red thread of Hicks’ line. His implicit
perspective on the economic agent (Sec. 3, Sec. 5) is shown to be the sub-
structure underlying his research path and the common premise to his the-
ories of markets (Sec. 5), liquidity (Sec. 6), capital (Sec. 7), and risk (Sec. 8).
Hicks’ theory of the agent was intended to address the factual role of non-
measurable risk (i.e., learning-management), and was primarily concerned
with the price- and wealth-effects that the transaction costs – which fall un-
der the two categories of the costs of learning (measuring risk) and the costs
of moving (changing position) – entail for learning-induced behaviours.
2 Paradise Lost
Without sacrificing his literary passions for La Divina Commedia and Par-
adise Lost, Hicks graduated in ‘Philosophy, Politics, and Economy’ at Oxford
in 1925. He wrote his dissertation, an empirical study on determination of
wages, unblessed by any Marshallian baptism, the canon for English stu-
dents of political economy. Although his best marks were in philosophy and
politics (Hamouda, 1993, p. 7), in 1926 a greater demand for economists led
him to the LSE to keep up his work on applied labour matters. As he was
able to read Italian, French and German, the veteran of the Italian front,
H. Dalton, exhorted him to study the theory of value in Pareto’s Manuale.
In addition, this theory appeared to be consistent with their department’s
prevailing ideology, championed by E. Cannan, of the reality of ‘Paradise’:
only let the price-mechanism work, and a decentralized economic system
will promptly produce optimal results.
Things did not look that simple any more as, in 1929, Robbins joined
2The whole bibliography of Hicks’ oeuvre is in Hagemann and Hamouda, 1994, pp. 260-
70. It counts about 230 titles covering every angle of economic theory.
3He never committed much to this or that school of economic thought, and considered
economics ‘a discipline, not a science’ (cf. 1983, pp. 365-75) because ‘since it is a changing
world that we are studying, a theory which illumines the right things at one time may
illumine the wrong things at another . . . There is, there can be, no economic theory which
will do for us for everything we want all the time’ (1976A [1983], pp. 4-5).
4Literature on Hicks’ line is mainly centred on his Nobel lecture (1973) and related
works (cf. in particular Hicks, 1977), where he insists on the continuity of his concern
with ‘the mainspring of economic growth’, i.e., innovation. Although the mainstream of
post-war economics assumes that such mainspring is speculation, Hicks gives the bases of
his standpoint for granted. Such bases are nothing else than our Hicks’ thread.
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the LSE and directed Hicks to Bo¨hm-Bawerk, Wicksell5, and Knight’s Risk,
Uncertainty and Profit, ‘the background from which I began on the things
which follow . . . not yet even the Austrians’ (1982, p. 11). Knight’s book
inspired his first important paper, ‘The theory of uncertainty and profit’
(1931), where we can spot something like a declaration of intent for a re-
search programme inspired by Knight’s point that the definition of the state
of knowledge marks the beginning, not the end, of the relevant uncertainty:
If it is maintained that the doctrine of measurable risks gives a fair ap-
proximation to the truth, that may be admitted; but an approximation
is of little use when it is no simpler and less illuminating than the truth
itself. . . . the grouping of measurable risks is simply a limiting case,
and not a very important one, of the general principle of reduction.
(1931, p. 175n)
Hicks appears to have been influenced by Knight’s emphasis on ex ante
non-measurable risk, the ‘Risk’6 that can be measured only ex post, in
consequence of learning. Still, he was too young and ignorant of monetary
theory to go further than allusions and hypothesise that the law of large
numbers gave sufficient grounds to an aggregate IS equilibrium assumption
(ib., p. 187f). The final draft of the article dated to 1930, when he set his
Knightian concerns temporarily aside and arranged his earliest works in a
book to give a boost to his academic career.
With The Theory of Wages (1932), Hicks ‘started more or less where
the new macroeconomics is now, although in that book he was concerned
with stationary states and correct foresight rather than with steady-state
growth and rational expectations’ (Hahn, 1990, p. 544). When dealing with
the working of competition (1932, pp. 58f), however, he admitted being per-
plexed with this ‘Elementary economic analysis, which culminates in the
determination of the conditions of equilibrium . . . [because this] assumes,
when it does deal with change, that the change has not been foreseen, but
that, when it takes place, everyone can count on the new conditions being
maintained’. As actual agents naturally consider new information unstable
and uncertain, such an equilibrium/paradisiacal approach ‘naturally leads
to paradoxes’ (i.e., into the labyrinth), both logical and pragmatic.
As for a possible basis of a paradise-lost theory, Hicks suggested the
‘costs of transference’ (ib.). Whereas in equilibrium analysis they can be
assumed away, in non-routine (learning) conditions, i.e.,
When a market is not in equilibrium, costs of transference cannot be
spread over an indefinite period. Even if it is certain that the change
5And Walras, albeit for mere didactical reasons ascribable to his Paretian pedigree.
6As for his concern with Knight’s distinction and terminology see Sec. 8. In fact, Hicks
often called ‘uncertainty’ what economists, following Knight, are accustomed to calling
‘risk’, and vice versa: ‘Risk’ was non-measurable risk, ‘uncertainty’ measurable risk (cf.
e.g. 1973B [1977], pp. 137, 147; 1974B, pp. 37f).
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will be a change for the better, it is not certain (and indeed it is
highly improbable) that the new position will long continue to be the
best attainable. It would be highly imprudent to change unless the
cost of changing would be covered by the gain within quite a brief
period. Costs of change, therefore, become a vastly more important
influence on action tha[n] they would be under conditions of stationary
equilibrium. (ib., p. 59, my it.)
In the meanwhile, Hicks was being initiated in monetary thinking through
Hayek’s seminars on Prices and Production at the LSE. Setting the stage
for monetarism, Hayek’s (1928) perfect foresight equilibrium, compatible
with variations in relative prices but not with monetary disorders, displayed
monetary policy as a major constraint on the self-regulation of an economic
system. For Hicks, however, the factual role of non-measurable risk made
such equilibrium, and any supposedly ‘neutral’ monetary policy, too para-
disiacal to trust. He gave an outline of his first approach to money in a
letter to Robertson: since money is there to finance learning-induced be-
haviours, i.e., to come to grips with non-measurable risk7, ‘the use of money
is inconsistent with economic equilibrium’ (1973B [1977], p. 137).
3 First steps
That economic fluctuations arise, is sufficiently explained by Imperfect Fore-
sight [non-measurable risk], that they take the form that they do is to be
explained largely by the close connection between imperfect foresight [i.e.,
the use of a Store of Value] and the use of a Means of Payment. (1933 [1982],
p. 41)
The point of his first monetary article8 was that disequilibrium is due
to the natural fact of Risk and not, as Hayek insisted, to the use of money.
Disequilibrium being ineradicable, ‘Monetary theory, in the strict sense, falls
outside [stationary ] equilibrium theory’ and ‘even a system of pure laisser-
faire would be subject to monetary disturbances’ (ib., p. 35).
A pivotal reading for the subsequent evolution of his monetary thinking
was the German translation (1933) of Myrdal’s Monetary Equilibrium (1931
[1939]). In search of a policy-rule to restore monetary stability, Myrdal cast
aside Wicksell’s natural equilibrium (conceivable only in routine conditions)
and adopted temporary equilibrium9, ‘a momentary market equilibrium in
7If all risks were actually measurable, holding money would be unnecessary, as any
sum exceeding planned current expenditure (and insurance) would be lent until the day
comes of the transaction scheduled to be financed with that sum.
8‘Gleichgewicht und Konjunktur’ was published in 1933 and made available to English
readers (‘Equilibrium and the Cycle’) only in 1980, thanks to R. Clower.
9Whereas a stationary equilibrium is an equilibrium over a period of time, a flow-
equilibrium, an equilibrium of an income account, a temporary equilibrium is a balance-
sheet equilibrium, a stock-equilibrium, an equilibrium at a point in time.
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which price-expectations are taken as data’ (1979A [1983], p. 360). Myrdal’s
eventual suggestion was to keep administered prices (and interest rates) sta-
ble, so as to anchor market behaviours to robust price-expectations (Myrdal,
1931 [1939], p. 135; cf. Hicks, 1934 [1982], p. 44).
This suggestion of Myrdal’s is endorsed in Hicks’ ensuing ‘Suggestion for
Simplifying the Theory of Money’ (1935A)—the Simplification hereafter.
This ‘is usually read as a foundation of neoclassic monetary theory and a
forerunner of portfolio selection theory. Undoubtedly, it is both things. Its
concluding passages, however, . . . show that it is something else, besides
and . . . beyond that’ (De Cecco, 2008, p. 159). Indeed it is. The Sim-
plification is based on the role of ex-ante non-measurable risk and focuses
on learning-induced behaviours10: since ‘[unexpected] present prices affect
the demand for money mainly through their effect on wealth and on price-
anticipations’ (1935A, p. 14n), Hicks adopted Myrdal’s temporary equilibria
assuming given endowments and price-expectations. As the combined effect
of unexpected prices and unexpected variations in total wealth (themselves
‘accompanied by a change in anticipations’, ib., p. 16) on money demand
can be ambiguous11,
The assumption which seems to me most plausible, most consistent
with the whole trend of our analysis, and at the same time to lead to
results which at any rate look realistic, is one which stresses the proba-
ble differences in the reactions of different members of the community.
(ib., p. 17, my it.)
This is no less than the prelude to his later distinction between flex-
price and fixprice market behaviours. In the Simplification, Hicks singled
out two categories of agents, ‘sensitives’ and ‘insensitives’, in relation to the
constraining power of transaction costs12 upon an agent’s learning-induced
demand for money. An agent’s demand will vary in a fairly ‘sensitive’ way
when transaction costs are unimportant relative to his immediately dispos-
able wealth (liquidity). If, as more generally is the case, his liquid wealth
10‘If I am right, the whole problem of applying monetary theory is largely one of deducing
changes in anticipations [learning] from the changes in objective data which call them forth’
(1935A, p. 13). In my view, this sentence is Hicks’ line in a nutshell.
11The extension of the Wicksellian process to the dark side of the quantities was a
major concern for both Keynes (1930) and Hayek (1931). On the wealth-effects of non-
equilibrium transactions in Hicks’ works of the 1930s, see Donzelli (2010, pp. 25ff).
12‘The costs of transforming assets from one form to another’ (1935A, p. 6). In the
Theory of Wages they were called ‘costs of change’ (1932, p. 59), ‘cost of changing’ (ib.),
‘costs of movement’ (ib., pp. 60, 61, 62). ‘This is of exactly the same character as the cost of
transfer which acts as a certain impediment to change in all parts of the economic system;
it doubtless comprises subjective elements as well as elements directly priced’ (1935A,
p. 6). Along these general notions, transaction costs ought rather be called ‘transition
costs’ (I owe this point to an anonymous referee). That the emergence of the concept is to
be dated (at least) back to The Theory of Wages is an aspect neglected by Klaes (2000),
who stops at the Simplification.
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is not so great as to make transaction costs negligible, his induced demand
will be rather ‘insensitive’.
All in all, liquidity constraints induce agents to refrain from price-effects
and release wealth-effects on buffer stocks (ib., p. 17f). As trade between
the ‘sensitives’ gives rise to prominent and cumulative (pro-cyclical) price-
effects, it is (as in Myrdal) ‘the insensitive people who preserve the stability
of capitalism’ (ib., p. 18). Therefore, ‘we must not be led aside by a feeling
that . . . all would go well if we reverted to free trade and laisser-faire. In
doing so, we are no better than the Thebans who ascribed the plague to
blood-guiltiness’ (ib.). Hicks was in fact invoking Sophocles to highlight a
pivotal aspect13 of his thinking.
4 The ‘muddle’
The idea that the temporary equilibrium method could somehow enable to
analyse economic change as a learning process was one of the key aspects of
interwar economics, and accordingly it was tested with disparate hypotheses
on learning. For example, Lindahl (1929, 1930) had elegantly modelled a
Wicksellian process driven by adaptive price-expectations in a single perfect
market14. On this basis, Myrdal (1931, ch. 6) had pointed up the virtues of
imperfect markets, where current prices were not (sensitively) affected by
current trades, although without providing any theory of their functioning
(still unavailable at the time).
Given his emphasis on the stabilising role of the ‘insensitives’, the author
of Value and Capital (VC hereafter) could not neglect the role of imperfect
markets (1939, ch. 21.6). The VC project, however, was the exploration
of an altogether separate hypothesis, namely that Lindahl’s approach to
adaptive learning in a perfect market was extendable to n perfect markets.
Therefore, the first issue to address was not the management of learning,
solved by hypothesis, but the aggregation of markets. The first step in that
direction was an article (Hicks and Allen 1934) that secured aggregation
within a restated Paretian setting. The first half of VC and twenty-three of
the twenty-five pages of its mathematical appendix, i.e., all that would lead
to the neoclassical synthesis, stems from this paper.
13In Markets, Money and Capital. Hicksian Economics for the Twenty-First Century
(2008), a collection of papers by a number of very distinguished economists (three Nobel
laureates among them), the co-editors R. Scazzieri, A. Sen and S. Zamagni quite rightly
emphasized that, in Hicks’ oeuvre, ‘An important unifying theme was the attention to eco-
nomic rationality ‘in time’ and his acknowledgement that apparent rigidities and frictions
might exert a positive role as a buffer against excessive fluctuations in real and nominal
magnitudes. This emphasis on the virtue of imperfection significantly distances him from
both the Keynesian and monetarist approaches’ (p. i).
14Lindahl is in London looking for someone to translate his works (Lindahl, 1939): he
picks out Ursula Webb, scholar of public finance and future Mrs Hicks.
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The second step was ‘Wages and interest: the dynamic problem’ (1935B),
where he aimed at embodying learning in a three-market barter model (the
prototype of IS-LM and the last half of VC ). The title reflects Hicks’ aware-
ness that the introduction of learning implied that the leading question of the
model was ‘the way in which the firm’s production plan . . . will be affected
by changes in the prices and price-expectations which govern it’ (1935B
[1982], p. 73). He thus immediately realized, as Keynes (1936) would, too,
that consistent comparison of a sequence of two temporary general equilib-
ria required the absence of learning in between, i.e., no ‘false’ trading (with
associated wealth-effects)—in two words, perfect transparency. So,
it is very important to be clear first of all that the changes with which
we are concerned are purely hypothetical changes. We are still on our
first Monday; we are examining the differences between the production
plan actually adopted and that which would have been adopted if prices
or price-anticipations had been different. (ib.; my it.)
This restriction to counterfactual logic rules out adaptive learning and is
transmitted to the VC model, where in fact price-expectations are eventually
assumed elastic to current prices (ch. 20), i.e., in a system of perfect markets,
to current learning! So, as it involved an improper combination of past
ignorance (learning process) and present omniscience (general equilibrium),
the VC model proved inconsistent with its own design (adaptive general
equilibrium). So to speak, the cart (aggregation) was placed before the
horse (learning); in the Simplification, instead, things were set to rights.
I sometimes feel, looking back, that it ought to have been my duty, after
writing [the Simplification], to have abandoned all other interests, and
to have devoted myself entirely to pushing forward along the road on
which I had taken first steps. . . . I allowed myself to be distracted,
first by the writing of Value and Capital . . . and then by the General
Theory of Keynes. (1982, p. 9, my it.)
Both his Lindahlian (VC ) and Keynesian interests proved ‘distractions’
from his more fundamental Myrdalian (Simplification) one. His interest in
Keynes’ book was due to the fact that Keynes deemed Hicks the best on the
market to valorise the Liquidity Preference doctrine, and asked him to be its
first reviewer (cf. 1973B [1977], p. 142). Yet, regarding Keynes’ monetary
approach as a simplification of his Simplification, Hicks (1936) focused on
the multiplier.
Since it is a purely real single-period effect enclosed within two monetary
(temporary) equilibria, the multiplier can only be determined as a perfect
transparency effect15 (cf. Keynes, 1936, p. 50). For it also to be effective, the
15Accounting excess supply as future supply, effective demand and current supply can
be kept identical.
8
extra incomes of the wage-good sector (out of the expenditure of the new
employees in the capital-good sector) need to be reinvested; hoarding, in
fact, would entail an ineffective (precautionary) demand. As the combined
effect of time-to-build and perfect transparency is a nominal adjustment
(1936 [1982], pp. 91, 93f), Hicks remarked that Keynes was overlooking a
third condition for the multiplier to be effective, namely that the supply of
consumption-goods be very elastic. This, however, clashes with the corol-
lary of the first condition (perfect transparency) that ‘the period [is] taken
short enough for us to be able to neglect changes in expectations within it’
(ib., p. 87n). Thus Hicks’ first impression was that, with its inattention to
both non-measurable risk and the time-to-build, Keynes’ new technique was
‘conservative: more conservative than in the Treatise’ (ib., p. 99).
Six months later (Sep. 1936) the Econometric Society met in Oxford.
Hicks was invited to translate Marshall’s relations into Keynes’s: ‘Since
our purpose is comparison’ (1937, p. 148), he set out the IS-LM model.
Having the above-mentioned ‘conservative’ aspect in mind, his scepticism
about IS-LM is not surprising: the presumed equivalency of marginal cost
and marginal productivity – as in the General Theory itself – resulted in
the neglect of both non-measurable risk and the time-to-build (‘all sorts
of questions about the timing of the processes under consideration’, ib.,
p. 158). The IS-LM, just like its prototype (1935B) and VC, could only
deal with ‘purely hypothetical changes’. Also Keynes’ (1936) method, ‘an
admirable one for analysing the impact effect of disturbing causes’ (1936
[1982], p. 87), could only yield ‘hypothetical results’ (ib.), counterfactual
recommendations. Moderns call them stabilization policies.
5 Learning and Planning
An article (1956) practically inaccessible for 26 years was, Hicks wrote, ‘from
my own point of view, one of my most important works’ . . . With it the
muddle . . . was at last cleared up. At last I could go ahead’ (1982, p. 217)16.
The object of VC being change, not stability, its celebrated definition of a
dynamic theory was to be censured17: dynamics is simply the ‘theoretical
analysis of the process of economic change’ (1956 [1982], p. 220), but compar-
ative statics is all we need whenever a process of change is not learning-driven
(a mechanical one). These two simple conclusions marked the clearing up
of his Lindahlian and Keynesian interests (cf. ib., p. 221-31) and of ‘the
muddle’ (1976B [1982], p. 289) they had led him to.
16It is ‘a clearer and sharper statement of my new view than anything . . . The later
work [‘Methods of dynamic economics’, rephrased twice (1965, pp. 1-127; 1985)] did add
some useful detail, but in adding the detail the main points were obscured’ (1982, p. 218).
17‘I call Economic Statics those parts of economic theory where we do not trouble about
dating; Economic Dynamics those parts where every quantity must be dated’ (1939 [1946],
p. 115). A good definition of a theory will refer to its object, not to its means.
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Before they can affect behaviour, mistakes need to be identified and in-
terpreted. It is therefore proper to single out two kinds of theories – one
relative to economic history, the other to economic policy – approaching
mistakes ex-post and ex-ante respectively, with the former however func-
tionally prior to the latter. The history-related economic theory aims at
explaining co-ordination failures, i.e., one’s mistakes due to inconsistencies
with others’ prospects and plans. Co-ordination failures can be discerned
counterfactually, using ex-post perfect foresight performance as a measuring
stick to assess the mistakenness of actual past expectations. Since measures
derived in this way are perfectly robust for a single period, Hicks named this
theory ‘Single Period Theory’.
Conversely, the policy-related economic theory aims at explicating ‘the
effects of the events of a first period upon the expectations and plans which
themselves determine the events of its successors’ (ib., p. 223, my it.), i.e.,
how mistakes affect learning and planning18.
It was the main contribution of the Bo¨hm-Bawerkian movement that
it emphasised the consequential time-structure of economic activity
even in a stationary state. For it thereby threw up the central dy-
namic issue—how to superimpose the pattern of change, which is one
time-pattern, upon the underlying pattern of capital-using production,
which is another. Though there are ways of avoiding this issue, they
are bound to result in depriving the behaviour under study of its pur-
posive character, so that the economic system is reduced to a mere
mechanism. (1956 [1982], p. 221)
This ‘central dynamic issue’ – the interplay of learning (‘the time-pattern
of change’) and planning (‘the underlying pattern of capital-using produc-
tion’) – would be the centre of attraction in his following theoretical ex-
plorations. This interplay can be conveniently approached with the special
case of an activity that needs no planning, i.e., the exhaustion of existing
arbitrage opportunities (speculation), which is precisely what the ‘sensitives’
of the Simplification do.
‘Sensitives’ try to improve their position by ‘beating the gun’ (moving as
fast as possible) as soon as any new measure (information) becomes avail-
able. The only precondition to be sensitive is to be free from constraints in
disposable wealth (liquidity), so as to keep transaction costs irrelevant over
time (cf. 1932, p. 59: ‘spread over an indefinite period’). As the decisional
temporal frame of a sensitive is a shortest possible period (the edge of a
point of time), a sequence of his moves can be analysed via the ordinary
temporary equilibrium model, i.e.,
18In the terms of the Simplification, this theory is for ‘deducing changes in anticipations
[and plans] from the changes in objective data which call them forth’ (1935A, p. 13). Since
mistakes are now relevant in an ex-ante perspective only, plunged into non-measurable risk,
the outcomes of such a theory can never be perfectly unambiguous as those vaunted by
optimum theories.
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the regular theory of price-determination in a speculative market . . .
Here, at any given moment, there are in existence given stocks of the
commodity; but, over a period, these stocks are being added to by
production and being drawn by consumption. At a moment of time,
or over any sufficiently short period of time, these additions and sub-
tractions can be taken as negligible; price is therefore determined by
the Liquidity Preference of the dealer, or, in other words, by their will-
ingness to hold stocks . . . Thus, at each moment, price is determined
by the condition that demand to hold equals the available supply. (ib.,
p. 227, my it.)
As the speculator has no liquidity constraints, speculation analysis can
do without the transaction costs (wealth-effects) associated with stock dise-
quilibria. A shortcut for future periods is thus licit: as all the stocks he/she
holds are voluntary, a speculator’s ‘liquidity preference’ depends on price-
expectations only. Since a speculator’s learning-management strategy (re-
acting instantly to changes in available information) is essentially adaptive,
the speculator can pay no heed to ex-ante non-measurable risk and analy-
sis of speculative dynamics can be carried out with ‘self-contained periods’
(1965, pp. 31f), along ‘flexprice’ lines.
Such a simplified setting is no longer licit with the general case of an
operator who has to face liquidity constraints. Someone who cannot af-
ford the speculative (adaptive) way of life can improve his/her situation
only by producing new, currently non-existing, opportunities (innovation,
cf. n. 4). Inputs (spending) preceding outputs (earnings), ‘productive’ moves
are characterized by a certain time span (the time-to-build) during which
new capacity is being built (or, more generally speaking, learnt). The rela-
tive construction costs (anticipations) are a kind of transaction costs having
a sinking effect on performance19: it is only when capacity is ready for use
that sales allow a producer to get back on his/her feet and finally improve
his/her situation.
Due to the time-to-build, a productive activity needs to be based on
planning. Due to the non-measurable risks impending all along the planning
span, a producer needs a proactive approach to learning-management. As
a matter of fact, in the general case of the producer, an adaptive (i.e.,
speculative) pricing strategy (i.e., letting current trade determine the selling-
price without adjustments in the capital structure) is hardly sustainable.
The invisible hand is an actual, visible threat to his/her running plan. Since
the risks relative to wealth-effects are more manageable than those relative
to price-effects, in non-speculative markets – ‘Q-markets’ (1956), or ‘Fixprice
markets’ (1965) – suppliers manage their selling prices.
As for analysis of a sequence of productive moves, what is needed is a
model whose ‘characteristic nexus’ is a ‘chain of causation, working from
19An anticipation is a sunk cost in an ex-ante perspective, a ‘crushing cost’ (1970, p. 276)
or, maybe better, a sinking cost.
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sales via stocks to inputs’ (1956 [1982], p. 228, my it.). Whenever actual
sales differ from desired (planned) sales, undesired stocks pile up, and their
relative wealth-effects can prevent a producer from disposing of the liquid-
ity required to keep his plan viable. Whenever a revision of the plan is
undertaken, the sinking effect of new anticipations (inputs) is carried over
at least beyond the time-to-build. In both links of the chain, the effects of
mistakes (on learning and planning) are thus carried over beyond the single
period. The time structure of productive activity is therefore consequen-
tial 20, and the (general) analysis of productive dynamics cannot be carried
with self-contained periods.
In dealing with the general case of economic agent, both the positive
and normative powers of a flexprice model are weak: ‘Where the Value and
Capital analysis goes wrong is that it treats an exceptional type of market
[i.e., a speculative market] as if it were the normal case’ (1956 [1982], p. 225).
The temporary equilibrium method can only apply to operative periods so
short that future information (non-measurable risk) can be safely left out of
account (e.g., present-day High-Frequency Trading).
In the general case, on the other hand, non-measurable risk cannot be
disregarded. The structure of planned activity is revised only when the costs
of a given change are valued less than its benefits. Since both investment
and disinvestment take time, appraisal of an opportunity for revision involves
conjecture about the extent to which future learning episodes and relative
wealth-effects can, within the planning span, affect its course. In this sense,
the continuation (viability) of a planned activity is what the general agent is
essentially involved in, which is why Hicks called the policy-related economic
theory ‘Continuation Theory’.
The viability (continuation) question calls for a shift of emphasis from fi-
nal positions (equilibrium conditions) to initial positions (and thus on trans-
action costs): a producer is always facing ‘the double problem: on the one
hand he must estimate what the course of demand will be [i.e., learning],
and on the other he must correct the excesses and deficiencies of stock that
result from past mistakes [i.e., moving]’ (1965, p. 95). Decision-making is in
fact made up of two stages, learning and moving. Both stages lay at the
core of Hicks’ explorations into money and capital. In monetary theory he
played up the aspect of learning, in capital theory that of moving.
20‘The essential difference, when we pass to Fixprice theory, is that the position in
which the firm finds itself at a point of time (at significant points of time) does not have
to be [as in Flexprice theory] a position that is chosen . . . it is by the absence of stock
equilibrium that disequilibrium itself is carried forward. And it is the carrying forward of
disequilibrium that is the interesting thing’ (1965, p. 86).
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6 Planning and Liquidity
After clearing up the muddle, Hicks was in a position to point out the
explanandum of a proper notion of liquidity :
a worse than ‘expected’ outcome must be dreaded more than a better
than ‘expected’ outcome is desired. This is not because of any abstract
‘law of diminishing marginal utility’; it is because of the impact which
such unfavourable outcomes may have upon the non-liquid elements in
the situation (things that may happen on the side of liabilities or on
the side of other, non-liquid, assets). (1962, pp. 793f)
As a preliminary step (1962, p. 789ff), Hicks recalled Keynes’ first no-
tion of liquidity (based on the great absentees in the General Theory, non-
measurable risk (learning) and transaction costs), which he thereafter stuck
to: an asset is more liquid than another if ‘more certainly realisable at short
notice without loss’ (Keynes, 1930, II, p. 67). Liquidity is therefore a matter
of ‘the difference between the current market price of the asset and what it
might fetch if it were to be disposed of at an unfavourable moment’ (1989,
p. 62), i.e., of nominal stability: ‘if the price is very variable, the asset is still
imperfectly liquid—because . . . the risk of loss remains’ (1974B, p. 43).
Yet nominal stability was not the end of the liquidity story. That is
why, to highlight the impact of non-measurable risk (learning) upon ‘the
non-liquid elements in the situation’, he rather (1967, pp. 38f) drew atten-
tion to the fact that, from the accounting point of view, assets can be clas-
sified as running (required for current activity), reserve (held for future
emergencies), or investment assets (held for a future profit), and focused
on two types of assets, money (M) and productive capacity (T ). Let T1
be capacity in use, T2 idle capacity, and T3 capacity under construction (cf.
time-to-build). Whereas T2 can protect a planned T1 against some specific
measurable risk, the need to hedge against non-measurable risks calls into
question the (greater) liquidity of the monetary asset: M3 is speculative
demand, M2 precautionary demand, and M1 ‘the money requirement for
. . . the general pattern of production (or consumption) on which the unit is
engaged’ (1967, p. 40), i.e., the assets required to back the running liabilities
of that pattern.
This ‘transactions requirement’ (ib., p. 37) is not exactly ‘a voluntary de-
mand, like the demand for commodities, which could be forced—even with
an effort—into the mould of marginal utility theory . . . in its nature [M1] is
a disequilibrium, not an equilibrium phenomenon’ (ib., p. 14f). In marginal
utility theory, just as in other equilibrium approaches, the demand for an as-
set is ideally sensitive to learning episodes because non-measurable risks are
assumed away. Equilibrium approaches only apply to the adaptive strate-
gies of speculative activity where transaction costs are actually irrelevant.
In the general case of liquidity constraints, instead, the liquidity required to
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financially sustain a running plan can only be rather insensitive : variations
in M1 will only follow changes in planning, but – due to the (dis)investment
costs (i.e., the costs of transforming plans) – not all learning episodes are
liable to affect a running plan.
A practical investor . . . does not in fact spread his ‘bundle’ over [any-
thing like] the whole gamut of securities with positive probable yield,
as the [equilibrium] theory would seem to have instructed him to do
. . . The reason why he does not do so is clear; it is simply the cost
of making transactions, which economists so easily leave out . . . Ob-
viously it is transaction cost which limits [risk] ‘spread’; but it does
much more than that. It introduces another qualification which trans-
forms the whole theory . . . If transaction costs were zero, it would
in fact be only necessary for the investor to look ahead to the ‘next
decision point’ . . . He could behave, all the time, as if there were only
one investment period of which he needed to take into account. (ib.,
pp. 31f)
We can conveniently approach Hicks’ views on risk (learning) and liquid-
ity (money) by starting, once again, with the special case of the speculator.
Thanks to the absence of liquidity constraints the speculator can afford a
peculiar learning-management strategy making the value of the portfolio
maximum and, at the same time, the most protected (to the extent allowed
for by the quality of information). The speculator adapts specularly to new
information, as a mirror image, unconditionally and without delay. The
speculative life-style is ‘fluid’ (1982, pp. 258ff), solely concerned with the
current period (M1 = 0,M2 = 0,M3 = L), as if he/she were about to cash
everything in.
The portfolio selection theory is [essentially] concerned with . . . a
single choice; and that is the point, I maintain, where liquidity slips
through. For liquidity is not a property of a single choice; it is a
matter of a sequence of choices, a related sequence . . . There is an
element in risk-bearing over time which escapes from the conventional
presentation, [i.e., whether] the choice admits of flexibility . . . the
flexibility that is given by the market. (1974B, pp. 37-41)
Liquidity slips through because the time structure of productive activ-
ity is consequential. A producer is primarily interested in avoiding falling
short of his transaction requirement, i.e., in minimizing the costs of learn-
ing management : ‘The Liquidity theory—Liquidity theory proper—will
tell the story entirely in terms of financial running assets and financial
reserve assets’ (ib., p. 49), and speculative demand is of no consequence
(L = M1+M2, M3 = 0). Conversely, M3 is all-important in the special case
of the speculative activity and, of course, in portfolio selection.
The costs of changing the structure of liabilities (transforming plans)
make M1 neither immediately nor directly sensitive to learning and incen-
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tives. Just as any financial windfall, ‘like surplus stocks of materials, au-
tomatically becomes a reserve asset’ (1967, p. 40), so pitfalls will be more
conveniently financed out of a reserve fund (M2), e.g. an overdraft facility. A
sequence of pitfalls implies accumulation of an undesired (unplanned) stock
of T2 bringing about, as a wealth-effect
21, a fall in M2. This after-effect is
symptom of a diminution in an agent’s capacity to sustain the liabilities of
his running plan, i.e., in the flexibility of his/her initial position 22. Liquid-
ity (i.e., the flexibility of initial positions) is essential to the management
of a process of change: to a ‘producer’, M1 are necessary to improve po-
sition, and M2 are necessary to cope with non-measurable risk (learning
management). Liquidity affords both the time-to-learn (to notice mistakes,
interpret them as co-ordination failures, and conjecture about opportune
reactions) and the time-to-move (to react). So, though it yields no inter-
est, liquidity yields something vital to the production of new opportunities
(innovation): liquidity yields Time.
7 Liquidity and Movement
Whereas Hicks’ monetary theory was mainly dealing with learning, i.e., ‘the
time-pattern of change’, his capital theory was mainly designed to focus on
‘the time-pattern of capital-using production’. In Capital and Growth (1965)
he considered both Keynesian and Walrasian approaches variations of that
‘Method of Sectorial Disintegration’ by which ‘The accounting distinction
between Consumption and Investment is converted into an industrial di-
vision’ (1973C, p. 5). With Capital and Time (1973C, CT hereafter) and
a number of related articles, instead, he returned to the Austrian (Bo¨hm-
Bawerkian) field. However uncultivated it may have been since the days of
Value and Capital (1939, chs. 15-17), he always thought it was the best to
tackle ‘the central dynamic issue’ (1956).
On one hand, since it focuses attention on the sectorial structure of
activity, the Walrasian approach plays up the vertical (temporal) structure
only indirectly, by derivation from a lagged production function. In doing
so, however, ‘the process is lost to sight’ (1973C, p. 13). The materialist
(Walrasian) concept of capital is therefore at home in single-period theory,
21‘Stocks may be allowed to pile up, until they become intolerable. But it is not the
stocks themselves that become intolerable . . . it is the financial effect of accumulating
them that is the crux. More and more of the seller’s capital becomes locked up in the
unsold stocks, so his financial reserves continually fall. Even if he borrows to finance his
holdings, his liquidity deteriorates’ (1979B, p. 92).
22Whereas optimality is a property of final positions, ‘Flexibility is a property of initial
positions. It refers to the cost, or possibility, of moving to various second period positions’
(Jones and Ostroy, 1984, p. 16). Amendola (1991) gives a synthetic account of Hicks’ line
in monetary theory, and Hicks’ notion of ‘liquidity as flexibility’ is explained and extended
in a direction which calls into question the complementarity of his monetary theory and
his neo-Austrian capital theory.
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i.e., in economic history (1970, p. 257), while in continuation theory it is
‘very hard to handle’ (ib.). For the latter theory the Austrian approach is
by far preferable, as its forte is to point out that capital is ‘an expression
of sequential production. Production has a time-structure, so capital has a
time-structure’ (1973A [1983], p. 100).
The Austrian image of a technique is an n-period duplex flow of a ho-
mogeneous input (a) and a homogeneous output (b):
(a0, a1, . . . , an ; b0, b1, . . . , bn ),
with b0 = . . . = bn−1 = 0, and bn = 1. Via a slight amendment, Hicks trans-
lated the Austrian technique into the neo-Austrian plan, where a temporal
stream of financial requirement (at) is sustaining a temporal stream of pro-
ductive capacity (bt). The only prerequisite for a productive process to be
capital-using is anticipation (b0 = 0). In accounting terms, there is invest-
ment until capacity is under construction (as long as bt = 0), disinvestment
(consumption) when capacity is thereafter being used (1973C, p. 5).
While the neo-Austrian representation of a plan calls into question both
sides of the balance sheet – at are liabilities, bt assets – the nature of capital
is the same as in the ‘classical’, old-Austrian theory: capital is a wage fund,
a monetary fund acting as collateral for the liabilities of a business23. And
yet risk and liquidity do not play an explicit role in his neo-Austrian theory.
The CT model is based on a Full Performance hypothesis (1973C, pp. 52-
55) that obviously implies perfect foresight. As non-measurable risk and
learning are ruled out, money is inessential, output the standard of value.
Still, the CT project was a building block of a continuation theory in that
it definitively fixed his early objection (1933) to Hayek’s proto-monetarist
views (cf. Sec. 3): ‘It is not true that by getting rid of money, one is auto-
matically in equilibrium’ (1973C, p. 133)—however equilibrium is conceived.
‘On the Austrian approach, one can start out of equilibrium (so far as
inputs and outputs are concerned) straight off’ (1970, p. 258): with the CT
model it is possible to show an initial position that is out of equilibrium as
far as the time-to-build is concerned, i.e., an initial position that is under the
pressure of a wealth-effect implied by an attempt at moving in reaction to a
learning episode, and leaving out of account the pressure implied by learning
expenditure. The model was vertically integrated (paying no heed to secto-
rial disintegration) because Hicks focused on the dynamic wealth-effects of
anticipations (vertical transaction costs, costs of investment), ‘more violent
and therefore more difficult’ (1973C, p. 133) – read: more fundamental –
23‘Even to this day, accountants are Fundists. It is not true, accountants will insist,
that the plant and machinery of a firm are capital [the materialist approach]; they are not
capital, they are assets. Capital, to the accountant, appears on the liabilities side of the
balance sheet; plant and machinery appear on the assets side. Capital, accordingly, is a
Fund that is embodied in the assets’ (1974A [1977], p. 154).
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than the single-period wealth-effects due to the costs of market transactions
(horizontal transaction costs, or costs of speculation).
The theoretical and political moral of Hicks’ neo-Austrian capital theory
was that, even with perfect foresight, any attempt at moving, if a slowdown
of activity is to be avoided, needs to be buttressed by an influx of resources
exogenous to the running plan24: transaction costs mark the way of change,
but liquidity is the flywheel of the actual course of change. Having such
steering in mind – and alluding to his half-hearted use of the Full Perfor-
mance hypothesis (just a ceteris paribus clause) – Hicks repeatedly quoted
J.S. Mill’s words:
this perpetual non-employment of a large proportion of capital is the
price we pay for the division of labour. The purchase is worth what it
costs, but the price is considerable. (Mill, 1874 [1974], p. 56)
8 Risk and Uncertainty
Hicks’ liquidity theory focuses on the transaction requirement of a plan of
action (M1), the same object of his investigations in capital theory, and
a buffer stock for the sake of non-measurable risk management (M2). We
shall devote these last pages to one of Hicks’ explorations in risk theory
which concerns these distinct domains of liquidity theory and which holds a
message offering conclusive confirmation of the thesis proposed in the present
article. Hicks rephrased his ‘Second Theorem in Risk Theory’ three times
(1977, pp. 166-76; 1982, pp. 251-56; 1989, pp. 137-42), lastly in appendix to
his last book, A Market Theory of Money :
I introduce it here, in spite of the very un-Knightian assumptions on
which it is based—assumption I do not much care for myself—because
it brings out a point, which in the end does not seem to depend on
them, and which should be quite a help towards understanding what I
am saying in this book. So I want to emphasize that my acceptance of
these assumptions is only provisional. (1989, p. 137)
The assumptions are indeed the usual, ‘speculative’ ones: a price-taker
is allocating a given sum into the maximum-expected-utility combination of
n securities under certainty-equivalence conditions. Even the utility func-
tion is ‘speculative’, i.e., the distribution among securities is independent
of the scale of operations (wealth effects): such is the case when u(y) =
24‘If new projects are started, without savings (or the release of reserves) to match them,
capital is just transmuted from one form to another – into the capital that is embodied
in the early stages of the new processes from that which was embodied in the late stages
of the old. It is possible, though not inevitable, that in the new form it will in the end be
more useful ; but this does not show up during the period of construction. At this stage




−(h−1), where A and B are positive constants and h is the re-
ciprocal of the price-elasticity of the demand function for the bundle of
securities. In the elastic case (h < 1), we have a St. Petersburg (risk-
neutral) utility function s.t. limy→0 u(y) = B and limy→∞ u(y) = +∞, with
u(y) < 0 throughout; in the inelastic case (h > 1), a Ramseyian function s.t.
limy→0 u(y) = −∞ and limy→∞ u(y) = B. Hicks focused on the inelastic
case because the Ramseyian agent is risk-averse, i.e., aware of the existence
of non-measurable risks25.
The zero point is the ‘disaster point’, a position with the greatest finite
bankruptcy risk. Its minus-infinity utility means that a speculator aiming
at continuation of his business always manages to avoid this point. Via
a slight amendment, Hicks generalised this setting to the general case of
the producer26: u(y) = B − A
h− 1 (y − c)
−(h−1), where c is a non-negative
constant and, of course, the disaster point, too. In the generalised case,
this point can be linked to the (current) transaction requirement of the
producer’s running plan and interpreted as a totally illiquid position where
continuation of that plan becomes impossible (so that the running plan must
be ‘truncated’).
As far as possible, the point is kept at a healthy distance: whoever is
hooked within a safe distance will be inclined to demand more liquid securi-
ties, giving up those less liquid securities (or property claims on productive
capacity) whose value may be lowest in some eventualities, and devoting
any windfall to repletion of the reserve fund (M2). Such may formally be
the case – with a small development of Hicks’ formulation having the plus
to imply that utility itself is an aspect of risk-bearing and that the utility
function is indeed a flexibility function – whenever u(y−c) < 0, i.e., as soon
as a truncation risk becomes measurable.
Substantially, however, the principle is much more general than that: in
a continuation perspective, liquidity constraints make operators ‘fairly insen-
sitive to price anticipations . . . [so that, with given commitments (cf. 1982,
p. 255),] most of the incentive to reduce their demand for money when events
turn out more favourably will be missing’ (1935A, p. 17). From a micro-
foundation perspective, that ‘the [involved] assumption of a rigid demand
for money snaps the connecting link between money and prices’ (1935A,
p. 17) amounts to saying that
out of a large population of persons and businesses . . . for the group
25‘Every business man must be risk-averse if he is planning to go on with his business.
Even the gambler must be risk-averse if he plans to go on with his game. If he has ceased to
be risk-averse he has just gone crazy. Risk-aversion is a consequence of rational behaviour’
(1989, p. 142).
26As ‘the small saver who is dependent upon income from his investments’ (1977, p. 172),
the operator who ‘has liabilities as well as assets or . . . is carrying on a productive business
which itself creates calls upon him’ (1982, p. 254, 1989, p. 141).
18
as a whole there must be a positive wealth effect . . . This is my sec-
ond theorem. It is very near to what I conjectured, many years ago,
in [the Simplification]. It was there no more than a conjecture; the
Bernoullian analysis, here presented, gives it a little more substance.
The qualification that it has introduced – that the bias in the wealth
effect is a matter of the strength (or comfort) of the operator’s posi-
tion – will stand, whether or not we accept the Bernoullian approach;
but without that approach, it would be hard to bring it out so clearly.
(1982, p. 255f, my it.)
That wealth effects are a matter of liquidity constraints is precisely what
‘should be quite a help towards understanding what I am saying in this book’
(1989, p. 137). That these effects are the stronger the liquidity-constrained
an agent becomes is also the essential property of Hicks’ view of the economic
agent we have, throughout these pages, maintained to be Hicks’ thread.
I am at last in a position to go back at Knight. His major distinction,
between measurable risks, based on cardinal probabilities (for which
there is evidence) and what he calls true uncertainties, which are not so
based, I fully accept. Indeed I would now attach much more importance
to it than I did in my first contribution to the subject [1931] . . . That
I hope I will have made clear in what precedes. The chief criticism
I would now make of him is that his terminology, which has greatly
influenced many subsequent writers, is rather confusing [cf. n. 6 ]. Our
disaster point should help to get it straight. For it suggest that what
is needed is a four-way, not a two-way classification. (1989, p. 141f, my
it.)
Hicks crosses Knight’s distinction with that of risky and unrisky choices,
depending on whether a truncation risk is probabilistically implied or not.
So, besides (1) measurable risky choices, mitigable with a form of insurance,
and (2) non-measurable risky choices, ‘which probably match the true un-
certainty of Knight’ (ib., p. 142), we have (3) measurable non-risky choices,
‘like buying the ticket for a lottery, where the loss involved in not getting
a prize is easily bearable’ (ib.), and (4) non-measurable non-risky choices,
‘such as one might think to be involved in the ordinary running of a business’
(ib.).
In our interpretation, the non-riskiness of a choice highlights its pruden-
tial character, that is the Ramseyian attitude of its maker. He/she aims at
moving on ‘flexible’ positions (0 < u(y− c) < B), where any truncation risk
is prevented from becoming ‘measurable’ (appreciable). In particular, with
given commitments and given information, the Ramseyian agent aims at di-
minishing the distance from B of his/her position. Yet, in the general case
of a producer’s (i.e., an ‘innovative’) choice the non-riskiness of the move is
itself non-measurable (uncertain), due to the non-measurable risks impend-
ing all the time it takes to move to his/her desired position. It is only in
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the special case of speculative choices out of liquidity-unconstrained portfo-
lios (or parts of them) that the non-riskiness of a move becomes measurable
(ascertainable).
His analogy with the lottery is indeed to the point as the fact that
loss can be borne so lightly has to do with the absence of liquidity con-
straints. The average economist’s presumption that so-called black swans
(non-measurable risks) can be neglected roots in this absence. Yet Hicks’
equivocal position in the history of 20th century economic theory was due
not only to the paradisiacal standpoint of the average economist, where the
lottery (speculation) is perceived as general form of the economic problem,
but also to his scant success in displaying the basics of his opposite perspec-
tive. This is the task we have attempted in these pages.
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